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SOME PHASES OF FLOWAGE RIGHTS
By CLAUDE J. HENDRICKS*
W ATER powers created by dams were originally used mainly
to operate the small local grist mill and saw mill by which the
inhabitants of a small territory were supplied with their flour and
corn meal for food and the timber with which they built their houses
and other necessary buildings.
In some rare cases dams were constructed to control the flow of
streams to aid navigation, whereby the products of factory and farm
were carried to market, and the people were enabled to travel from
place to place.
With the development of modern industry the uses of these water
powers have very materially changed. The small local grist mill has
practically disappeared, as has the saw mill, except in the heavily
timbered region, and the principal use of water power now is by
hydro-electric companies, whereby electricity is generated and distrib-
uted over large areas for furnishing power and light to cities, and to
the citizen in home, store and factory.
In the development of these water powers, even in the case of the
small saw or grist mill, the owner of the dam or power site frequently
found it necessary to use for purposes of a "mill pond" or reservoir
more land than he owned, and for this purpose he acquired the right
to flow or flood much additional land by grant, and sometimes he even
flowed or backed water upon land which he did not own, by means of
his dam, for such a period that he acquired the right to do so by pre-
scription.
In Wisconsin, and other states having large areas of cheap land,
covered with timber and threaded by streams capable of developing
water power, corporations or wealthy individuals or partnerships have
acquired large areas of lands, to cut off and market the timber, and
then develop by selling small holdings to settlers, or have acquired
such tracts for speculation, by developing them by inducing small
purchasers to take them, and where sales have been made of lands
bordering on streams, either with developed or undeveloped water
power, the seller, particularly when engaged in lumbering or the pro-
duction of electricity, has reserved flowage rights by various designa-
tions over the land sold.
These grants or reservations of flowage or flowage rights have been
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frequently before the courts, and with the constantly increasing develop-
ment of water power for the production of electricity, and the increasing
value of lands, will become more important in the future and doubtless
lead to more litigation until the meaning, construction, operation and
effect of such grants and reservations have been settled beyond doubt
or controversy.
This article is limited to a discussion, of a part only, of the questions
arising from and in connection with some of these grants or reserva-
tions and their nature, construction, transferability, and rights and
liabilities thereunder.
There is no uniformity of expression in either granting or reserving
such rights. Some deeds have reserved "the right to flow a part of
the described land with water perpetually by means of said dam." Here
was a reservation of flowage in connection with a definitely located ex-
isting dam, and was held to be an exception and something more than
a revocable license. Kronoff v. City of Worcester, 125 N. E. 394
(Mass. 1919).
Another deed in 1854 conveyed all of grantor's right in certain land
on a certain river, "also all my right of flowing water by the dam and
of using the same in the pond, or of drawing it through the dam,
all my right of repairing the dam or of booming or securing timber
upon my shores in said pond, or in the Great pond above it, with the
right of passing on said shores for said purposes, doing as little damage
thereby as may be practicable; also the right of flowing the Great
pond ;" and the court held that "the right to flow the Great pond above"
was not an indefinite right, but a specific right-the right necessary and
incident to the uses required by the whole grant; that the parties had
in mind the grant of an entirety-such flowage of the Great Pond
above as the existing dam when in perfect order, repaired, made tight,
would cause and no more. That the parties could not have intended
the construction of a different dam, one that might work destruction of
the riparian rights of the grantor and flow out his land beyond what
ever had been, or so far as he knew, had ever been thought of, and
denied the defendant, a fibre company, as successor in interest to the
grantee, the right to flow lands of the plaintiff, successor in interest
to the grantor, to a much greater height than at the date of the deed
without paying the damages caused by such flowage. Bennett v. Ken-
nebec Fibre Co. 3 Atl. 8oo (Me. 1895).
In 1865 the owner of land on both sides of a river conveyed a part
of said land, lying on the east side of the river "reserving to myself
the right of building a dam across said river at any point against said
land together with the right of flowage of said land at any and all
times caused by said dam when constructed," and the court held that
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the right of flowage was a reservation and not an exception, that it
created an easement appurtenant to the grantor's land which easement
was perpetual and the word heirs was not necessary to make it per-
petual. Smith v. Furbish, 44 Ati. 398 (N. H. 1894).
In connection with a mill the owners constructed a dam across the
river to supply water to operate it, the dam causing the water of the
river to overflow plaintiff's land, and the plaintiff executed a deed to
the owners of the dam, conveying to them "their heirs and assigns
forever all the rights of flowage caused by the mill dam over the fol-
lowing piece or parcel of land," the land being definitely described.
The original dam was destroyed, but was reconstructed at the place and
at substantially the same height as formerly maintained, and the court
held that the deed was not void because the precise location of the
dam was not given, nor was it essential to the validity of the deed that
the precise quantity of land overflowed should be stated, and that the
deed vested in the grantees, the right to overflow the land to the extent
resulting from the dam in its then condition (that is the time of the
execution of the deed); that the grantees were entitled to overflow
so much of the land as was reasonably necessary for its maintenance.
Having been erected prior to the time of the execution of the deed, the
conditions then existing must be taken as the basis of the grantees'
rights, and their successors in interest. It was further held that the
easement or right of flowage passed as an appurtenance of the mill
property, such property being the dominant estate. Schlag v. Gooding-
Coxe Co. io8 N. W. ii (Minn. 19o6).
Another deed conveyed the right and privilege, to erect a dam at
or below the entrance of the Small Portage into the Big Portage,
also the right and privilege to make races, dams, gates and necessary
appurtenances thereto on, across and through the land of the grantor,
"but no right is hereby given or granted to flow back the water on the
Little Portage further than the north bank of the same,--such dam or
dams, races and conduits of water to be made and used for the purpose
of water power." The court held, that to entitle grantee to flow grantor's
land, it was not necessary, that the dam be built on the grantor's land,
and that if the flowing was not unnecessary and was no greater
than would have been caused by building the dam and race on the
grantor's land, the deed authorized it; that the conveyance was intended
to grant a water power to which the dam and race were mere incidentals
and grantee was not compelled to use all of the privileges granted in
connection with the power unless he chose. Kilgore v. Hascall, 21
Mich. (187o) 505.
A deed after describing the land conveyed contained the following:
"excepting and reserving to first parties, their heirs and assigns in
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perpetuity, all flowage and riparian rights of every kind, including
the right to overflow and flood with water any part of said land which
may be overflowed by reason of the construction and maintenance of
any dam at Beaverton, Michigan."
The deed of the same land to grantor contained a similar provision
except that following the word "maintenance" it read as follows:
"of an artificial dam having a twenty-foot head of water at Beaverton,
Michigan."
At the time of the execution of these deeds there was an existing
twelve or fourteen feet high dam which was subsequently raised, so
that the flowage was increased, and the court held, that the owner of the
land was not liable for damages caused by such increased flowage; that
the reservations in the two deeds did not refer to any existing develop-
ment and by definitely reserving a greater height plainly pointed to
anticipated future development; that the right of flowage or to dam
water back above its natural level is an interest in land of value, in
its nature and easement which an owner of full title can reserve when
disposing of the fee, or he may retain the fee and deed the right of
flowage to others as a perpetual easement, which can only be acquired
by an instrument in writing under seal in the nature of a deed of con-
veyance or by prescription, and an omission by the riparian owner to
use such right does not impair his title or confer any right thereto
upon another. It is not the nonuser by the owner, but the adverse
enjoyment of it by another for the prescription period, which may
destroy his rights. Glidden v. Beaverton Power Co. 193 N. W. 862
(Mich. 1923).
A corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing cotton cloth
by means of mills and a dam conveyed certain land reserving to itself,
its successors and assigns, "the right to raise and forever maintain their
ram, by flashboards or otherwise, three feet above its present height,
without being subject to any claim or demand from said grantee, his
heirs or assigns, for damages to said Barnard farm or to said Upper
Intervals by reason thereof," and later the grantee conveyed to said
corporation its successors and assigns the right to flow said land "by
backwater from the dam of said corporation, raised and maintained
forever by permanent structure or otherwise, one foot above the present
permanent height thereof," and the court held that the reservation and
the grant of the right to flow the land created an easement appurtenant
to the mill privilege; the height to which the right to flow extended
was measured by reference to the permanent height of the existing
dam, but the easement would not be destroyed by taking down the
dam and erecting a new dam across the stream above the old dam,
on land which was a part of the mill privilege of the corporation, to
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which the easement of the right to flow was appurtenant, if the water
was not raised beyond the height mentioned in the reservation and
the grant, the easement of flowage, being appurtenant to the mill
privilege, was appurtenant to every part of the mill privilege. The
erection of a new dam on the mill privilege whether above or below
the old dam, if raised the water no higher than the right granted
would work no injury to the land owner for which he could recover.
Forbes v. Commonwealth, 52 N. E. 511 (Mass. 1899).
Certain lands were conveyed and the grantor 'at the same time,
as a part of the same transaction, executed an agreement under seal,
which was recorded, which provided that the grantees in the deed
or their assigns "may build a dam across said stream not more than
six feet in height above the bed of the river," and that the grantor,
his heirs and assigns, should not demand or receive any pay for
damages done to land or property whatsoever by reason of water
raised by the dam. A six foot dam, measuring the height from bed
rock in the bed of the river at the abutments of the dam, was erected
in 1853 which was replaced in 1883 by a new dam on the same site
and of the same height. In 1903 a new dam was built about fifty
feet below the old one but was seven feet above the then bed of the river
which had been deepened both by erosion and by quarrying the rock
from it. The court held that the grantees acquired the right to set back
the water upon the superior riparian lands to the extent that they
would be overflowed by a dam six feet high above the highest part
of the bed of the river on the grantees' land, the height and capacity
being the common instrument by which to measure the extent of the
water rights; that the height of the dam as fixed by the grant settles
the right to maintain the dam at that height, regardless of the extent
to which the water has been held and the land overflowed by the erec-
tion of the former dams, and evidence as to the flooding of the lands
during the time the old dams were in use, as compared with the flood-
ing since the erection of the new dam cannot control in deciding the
height at which the dam could be erected, and that the right to over-
flow to the full extent of the grant was not lost by non-user even for a
period of twenty years unless there was also an actual adverse pos-
session for twenty years. Haigh v. Lenfesty, 87 N. E. 962 (Ill. 1909).
Bearing in mind the principles of law as established in the foregoing
cases, what are the rights and liabilities granted, reserved or created
by provisions in deeds such as,--
i. "The right to set back water by dam or dams on the river below"
without specifying the dam or its location, there being a dam of a certain
height erected for certain purposes such as floating logs to a saw mill, or
2. "The right to flow and set back water by a dam or dams in the
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river below on" certain described land, there being at that time no
existing dam, or
3. "The said grantors shall never be liable for any damages resulting
from the overflowing of said premises or any part thereof, or damages
to any improvements now or that may hereafter be upon the same,
or any part thereof, caused by any dams reservoirs or other devices
or improvements now or hereafter constructed, maintained or owned in
whole or in part by the grantor, in, upon or about the Pine River, or
any of its tributaries, connecting streams or branches" and the grantor
has dams on such streams but which could not possibly under any
practical use of them set back water on the land conveyed, or
4. "Excepting and reserving for myself and my assigns the use of
all the water power, water flowage, and dam privilege forever," the
grantor owning no other land on the river and there being no dam
or water power in which he was interested, and afterwards conveying
his reserved right to the owner of a dam several miles below.
The cases above referred to clearly establish the construction to be
given to a grant or reservation of flowage rights and the rights and
liabilities of the parties where the height of the dam is clearly shown
either by express specification in the grant or reservation or by refer-
ence to an existing dam; where the area to be flowed is clearly defined,
and where there exists at the time of the creation of the right a domi-
nant and servient tenement.
Considering the grant or reservation mentioned at (i) above there
being an already existing dam, such dam fixes the extent of the flowage
if at the time of the grant or reservation such dam caused a flowing
of the land in question, the courts applying the rule of construction
that where the language of the deed is ambiguous, the court may con-
sider all the attendant surrounding circumstances, the existing state
of facts, the situation of the property and the condition or state of
things granted at the time.
If the dam is destroyed, the right of flowage is not lost, but a new
dam either in the same or a different location may be erected, provided
it does not increase the flowage or if the original dam leaks or is
poorly constructed so that the entire right of flowage is not exercised
it may be repaired to the extent necessary to fully enjoy the right
granted or reserved. The fact that subsequent to the grant or reserva-
tion the dam is put to different use or the power created thereby is
differently applied does not change the right or liability as to flowage.
The right of flowage is regarded as an easement, appurtenant to the
dam, is assignable and passes with conveyance of the dam, and any
purchaser of the land flowed takes it burdened with such easement, and
is chargeable with notice of the extent to which it may be used. If,
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however, the dam on the river below does not at the time of the grant
or reservation, cause the flowing of any of the land in question it
would seem to follow that, either a dam might be built below said land
or the existing dam raised, and that the flowage thereby created be
regarded as the right granted, the court in such case applying the rule
of construction that an instrument intended to operate as a deed should
so operate if it is not legally impossible for it to do so, or the rule that
where a doubt arises as to the real intention, an interpretation which
plainly leads to injustice should be rejected or the rule that some mean-
ing should be given to every clause, word or expression if it can
reasonably be done, and is not inconsistent with the general intent
of the whole instrument so that the deed may operate, if by law it may,
according to the intention of the parties.
Considering the grant or reservation above mentioned in (2), the
instrument should be construed to permit the erection of a dam, on
any part of the land belonging to the grantor of the flowage easement,
of if he owned no land at that time on any land he might thereafter
acquire below on the stream, and raise the water by means thereof
to any height necessary for the proper enjoyment of the dam privilege
even to the extent of completely flowing the land over which the
flowage easement is granted.
If at the time of the grant or reservation, the grantee of the flowage
right 'owns land below on the stream, the right of flowage is clearly
an easement, and appurtenant to the dam privileges, and therefore
assignable even without use of the words heirs and assigns. Where,
however, the grantee of such flowage right is not the owner of a dam
or dam site or land below on the stream, the courts while treating it
as an easement and holding it assignable have apparently lost sight
of the various kinds of easements and the distinctions between them.
Thompson on Real Property, Vol, i, Page 359, defines an easement
as a privilege without profit which one has for the benefit of his land
in the land of another, or it is a right without profit, created by grant
or prescription, which the owner of one estate may exercise in or over,
the estate of another for the benefit of the former. The same author
in the same volume, at Page 364, gives the essential qualities of ease-
ments as,--first, they are incorporeal; second, they are imposed on
corporeal property; third, they confer no right to a participation in
the profits arising from such property; fourth, they are imposed for
the benefit of corporeal property; fifth, there must be two distinct
tenements, the dominant, to which the right belongs and the servient
upon which the obligation rests, and distinguishes between an easement
appurtenant which inheres in the land, is a privilege incident to particu-
lar land, concerns the premises, is necessary to the enjoyment thereof,
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is in the nature of a covenant running with the land, attached to the
land to which it is appurtenant, and passing by deeds of conveyance,
while an easement in gross is a right in the land granted for the per-
sonal use and benefit of an individual, and is not incident to particular
land, and while it is sometimes considered as an interest in land which is
assignable it is more frequently held to not be assignable. This is
apparently the belief of the court in Spensley v. Valentine, 34 Wis. 154,
although in Poull v. Mockley, 33 Wis. 482, and decided a year earlier,
the court held that in Wisconsin an easement in gross will be held
assignable by the grantee.
The grant or reservation at (3) above does not in terms grant or
reserve any right of flowage, but applying rules of construction here-
inbefore referred to would seem to require a holding that such a right
of flowage was intended to be granted. To provide that grantors
shall never be liable for any damages resulting from overflowing of
the premises caused by any dams would seem equivalent to reserving
the right of flowage without liability for the damages caused thereby.
The right to erect dams other than those existing, flowage from
which does not or cannot reach certain of the lands in question has
been discussed in connection with (2) above.
Where the grant or reservation does not fix the height of the dam
or the extent of the right of flowage, two other interesting questions
arise.
First, as to what the intention of the parties should be construed
to be where conditions have so changed that a dam such as in common
use at the time of the grant or reservation, and answering all the power
requirements known at that time, would be useless for the power re-
quirements at the time of the exercise of the right of flowage. Can they
be held to have intended that the requirements of the grantee at the
time of exercising his rights, rather than his requirements at the time
of the grant are controlling. The failure to limit the right or fix its
extent or the time of its exercise should be held to show that the right
was unlimited and to be exercised in accordance therewith. Applica-
tion of the rule of construction that a grant is to be taken most strongly
against the grantor, would seem to require the former construction.
Not having limited the right or fixed its extent, or the time of its
exercise, he should be held to have intended that the grantee could
flow the land to such extent as he required at the time of construct-
ing the dam.
Second. Does the construction of a dam and flowing the land fix
the rights of flowage under the rule of construction that the practical
construction given the instrument by the parties in the manner of
exercising their rights under it may be considered and even be con-
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trolling where the meaning is doubtful. The older authorities while
not clear would seem to indicate that such is the law, and that the dam
cannot be raised or the flowage increased without further compensating
the owner of the land flowed. Such a holding would seem contrary
to the weight of reason and the later authorities, and in violation of
the rule that failure to use does not destroy the right. The grant or
reservation being unlimited, the right ought to be adequate for the
needs of the user. Having found it necessary for his requirements
at one time to build only a small dam and flow only a limited portion of
the land, when, at that time, had he so desired or profitable use re-
quired, he might have erected a dam to any height and flowed the
land to any extent, ought not to deprive him of a right which he had
but merely failed to use, particularly when to deny such right makes
the thing granted of no value.
The grant or reservation shown at (4) above has been passed upon in
Wisconsin in the case of Hemmis v. Consolidated Water Power and
Paper Co. 173 Wis. 519 (T921) 181 N. W. 743.
The deed containing the reservation was executed in 1896, the
grantor owning no other lands on the stream. There were rapids
a short distance below the land in question and prior to the deed there
had been a survey at the point to ascertain the head of water which
could be developed, and it was suggested that a head of twelve feet
was possible which would have flowed all the land in question. The
dam causing the flowage is some six or seven miles below the land
in question, the owner of the dam acquiring in July 1916, the flowage
rights reserved in said deed of 1896.
In 1914 and for some years prior the dam had been maintained at
a height of ten feet, which did not cause any flowage of the land
in question. In February 1916 it was raised to about seventeen feet
which flowed a part of the land and later it was raised to about nine-
teen feet and it was proposed to raise it to twenty-one feet, which
would considerably increase the flowage.
The court held that the reservation in the deed gave the grantor
and his assigns the right to flow the land with the dam at the proposed
height of twenty-one feet without liability for the damage caused
thereby; that there was no ambiguity in the deed permitting the court
to consider surrounding circumstances to ascertain the meaning of the
language used; that there was no language or limitations as to the
time or place of exercising the right to build a dam or to cause the
flowage; and the reservation should be given its natural interpretation
not confining the grantor and his assigns to the location of the dam to
any particular place; that the reservation being in effect a grant by
the grantee should be construed most favorably to the grantor; and
that the use of the land by the owner of the fee by cutting timber
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and pasture was not inconsistent with the easement of flowage and
did not constitute an adverse use barring the owner of the dam and
right of flowage from the right to flow said land.
It is impossible within the limits of this article to discuss all the
various grants and reservations of flowage rights which have been
before the courts for consideration, for each has largely been de-
termined by some language, fact or condition peculiar to itself, but
only to refer to certain grants and reservations presenting some slightly
different question and cite some cases which establish principles of
general application, which enable one to arrive with a fair degree of
certainty at their construction.
